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NOTES
Conjugal Visitation Rights and the Appropriate Standard
of Judicial Review for Prison Regulations
Conjugal visitation rights allow prison inmates and spouses to
visit privately and have sexual relations. A number of countries,
particularly in Latin America, permit conjugal visits.1 Although in
the United States only Mississippi and California currently permit
conjugal visitation, the experience of these two states shows that such
programs are workable. 2 Conjugal visitation has met with varied
reaction in the literature,3 but persuasive arguments have been made
that it would offer potential psychological benefits to the prisoner,4
reduce prison homosexuality,5 and allow the inmate to preserve his
or her marital ties. 6 Nevertheless, the reaction of penal administrators
in this country to conjugal visitation has been largely negative.7
Recently an increasing number of prison inmates have brought
suit challenging the power of states to deny them conjugal visitation
rights. 8 The argument most frequently advanced is that the denial of
l. A 1963 survey revealed that 39 countries prohibit conjugal visitation and 22
permit it. C. HOPPER, SEX IN PRISON 5-6 (1969).
2. Conjugal visitation programs have been established at the Parchman penitentiary
in Mississippi and at all 12 institutions and most camps in the California correctional
system. For a description of these programs, see text at note 150-56 infra.
3. See, e.g., H. BARNES &: N. TEETERS, NEW HoRIZONs IN CRJIIIINOLOGY 510-II (3d ed.
1959); P. BUFFUM, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PRISONS 28 (1972); J. FISHMAN, SEX IN PRISON
176-80 (1934); C. HOPPER, supra note l, at 144-48; H. KLARE, PEOPLE IN PRISON 64-66
(1973); Gagnon &: Simon, The Sodal Meaning of Prison Homosexuality, 32 FED. PROBA•
TION, March 1968, at 23, 27; Ibrahim, Deviant Sexual Behavior in Men's Prisons, 20
CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 38, 44 (1974); Johns, Alternatives to Conjugal Visiting, 35 FED.
PROBATION, March 1971, at 48-49; Plotkin, New Trends in Prison and Parole, in PRISON•
ERS' RIGHTS SouRcEBoOK 577, 583-85 (M. Hermann&: M. Haft ed. 1973); Zemans &: Cavan,
Marital Relationships of Prisoners, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 50, 57 (1968).
4. C. HOPPER, supra note 1, at 146.
5. J. FISHMAN, supra note 3, at 184-85; C. HOPPER, supra note l, at 146; Ibrahim,
supra note 3, at 44. Contra, P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 28; Gagnon &: Simon, supra
note 3, at 27; Johns, supra note 3, at 49.
6. J. FISHMAN, supra note 3, at 184-85; Balogh, Conjugal Visitations in Prisons:
A Sociological Perspective, 28 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1964, at 52, 54; Wilson, Conjugal
Visiting and Family Participation in California, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETY-NINTII
ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CoRRECIION OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AssoCIATION 261
passim (1969). Contra, Johns, supra note 3, at 49.
7. A poll of prison administrators published in 1964 indicated a strong opposition
to conjugal visits. Over half of those questioned disliked the idea. Balogh, supra note
6, at 53. Unfavorable public reaction was most frequently offered as the reason for
denying prisoners conjugal visitation rights. Id. at 55-56. The prison administrators
also were concerned about cost, a potential increase in sex problems, custody and
security problems, and the possibility that incarceration would no longer be a sufficient
punishment or d~terrent. Id. at 52. See Markley, Furlough Programs and Conjugal
Visiting in Adult Correctional Institutions, 37 FED. PROBATION, March 1973, at 19.
8. See, e.g., Polakoff v. Henderson, 488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974), affg. 370 F. Supp. 690
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such rights constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by
the eighth amendment. This note discusses the less commonly made
argument that the denial of conjugal visitation is an impermissible
intrusion upon the rights of privacy of the married couple involved.9
The discussion will review the development of the right of conjugal
privacy for nonprisoners and then focus on the applicability of the
right to married pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. Of particular concern will be the appropriate standard of judicial review
in the prison context. After considering various approaches currently
employed by the courts, this note will propose a refinement of one
suggested standard and use it to assess the constitutionality of denying
conjugal visiting rights.
Several Supreme Court decisions have firmly established, at least
for nonprisoners, that the right of marital privacy is fundamental.
Skinner v. Oklahoma,10 in which the Court invalidated a state law
permitting sterilization of persons three-times convicted of certain
felonies, marked a major step in the development of the right. The
Court based its holding on the fact that "[w]e are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race."11 In Griswold v. Connecticut12 the Court showed
the same great deference to the rights of marriage and procreation,13
striking down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives in so far as the statute applied to married couples. The law
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934
(1971); Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Brown v. Gillman, Civil
No. 73-80-2 (S.D. Iowa March 30, 1973) (excerpted in 13 CRIM. L. REP. 2143); Stuart v.
Heard, 359 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1973); United States ex rel. Choice v. Johnson,
Civil No. 72-2060 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1972) (excerpted in 12 CRIM. L. REP. 2298); In re
Flowers, 292 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Wis. 1968). At least one suit has argued for a similar
right for unmarried inmates. Wilkinson v. McManus, - Minn.-, 214 N.W.2d 671
(1974). In only one case, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 3 PRISON L. REP.
20 (D.V.I. May 30, 1973), has the prisoner been successful.
Payne v. District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958), was one of the earliest
suits brought in this area and is cited as support in many of the later decisions. E.g.,
Polakoff v. Henderson, 488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974), atfg, 370 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Stuart v. Heard, 359 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1973). It was dismissed in a brief
per curiam opinion affirming the district court's holding that the complaint of a
prisoner's wife that she was being denied conjugal visiting rights without due process
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
9. A similar constitutional theory has been previously advocated in this context.

See Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry
Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21
BUFFALO L. REv. 669, 707 (1972). One federal district court has considered and rejected
the argument. Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
10. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
11. 316 U.S. at 541. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. 381 U.S. at 486, ·495.
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had a maximum destructive impact upon the privacy of the marital
relationship because it regulated the use of contraceptives, rather
than their manufacture or sale.14 The Court found the idea of allowing police to search marital beds for evidence of the use of contraceptives "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship. " 15
A narrow reading of Griswold would limit marital privacy to a
restraint on governmental enforcement methods that intrude upon
the marriage bed.16 This reading views the right exclusively as an
aspect of the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, language in the Griswold opinion
indicates that the right of privacy can also be found in the penumbras
of the first, third, fifth, and ninth amendments. 17 Furthermore, in a
later Supreme Court decision concerning a woman's right to obtain
a nontherapeutic abortion, the majority held the right of privacy to
be "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions on state action.''18 Although multiple constitutional bases do not necessarily imply a broad scope for the privacy
right, the fact that the fourth amendment has not been viewed as
its sole source suggests a broader scope than the narrow reading of
Griswold would allow.
Subsequent cases have expanded the Griswold holding so that the
right of privacy now extends beyond a restriction on state law enforcement methods.19 In Eisenstadt v. Baird29 the Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The
Court stated in dictum:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals.... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a cltlld.21

The Court here did not focus on the problems that may arise in
·enforcing the statute; rather, it objected to the statutory purpose of
14. 381 U.S. at 485.
15. 381 U.S. at 486.
16. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. 381 U.S. at 484.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
19. See Brodie, Privacy: The Family and the State, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 743, 752-53.
See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
20. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21. 405 U.S .. at 453 (emphasis original).
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restricting individual choice with regard to childbearing. Similarly,
in Roe v. W ade22 the Court held that the right of privacy is "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."23 The Court found a Texas law making abortion a
crime except when necessary to save the life of the mother an impermissible infringement on the right of privacy. While it might be
argued that privacy protects only the rights to use contraceptives24
and to abort a fetus under certain conditions,25 the central holding
of these cases seems to be that married couples have a fundamental
right to be free of governmental intrusion into their decision to have
sexual relations. Thus, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold noted that " 'it is difficult to imagine what is more private
or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.' " 26
Moreover, the right to use contraceptives or to abort a fetus would
be of little consequence if the state could regulate marital relations. 27
In extending the fundamental right of conjugal privacy to prisoners and pretrial detainees, thre_e preliminary objections must be
met. Although it is now well established that "a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned
for crime,"28 until recently judicial review of inmate petitions challenging conditions of confinement were routinely dismissed under
the "hands-off" doctrine: "Courts are without power to supervise
prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules
or regulations." 29 The courts recently have been more receptive to
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (companion
case).
23. 410 U.S. at 153.
24. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
25. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For
lower court cases applying the right of privacy to state regulation of other aspects of
sexual relations between spouses, see Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); Buchanan
v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
26. 381 U.S. at 495, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
27. Even an individual's fundamental rights are not absolute. A state can override
a fundamental right if it shows a compelling state interest that is furthered by the
state infringement and that cannot be furthered by less drastic state regulation. See
text at notes 39-42 infra.
28. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 {1941).
29. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859
(1954). See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932
(1964); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956);
Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), afjd. on rehearing, 194 F.2d 917, cert. denied,
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the constitutional claims of inmates.3°For instance, in Cruz v. Beto81
a prisoner alleged that as a Buddhist he was denied a reasonable
opportunity to pursue his faith comparable to that offered other
inmates adhering to more "conventional" religious beliefs. The complaint was dismissed by the district court as within an area more
properly left "to the sound discretion of prison administrators."32
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for a hearing on the allegations of the complaint.38 The Court sum·
marized the duty of the federal courts in suits brought by inmates:
344 U.S. 822 (1952); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 829
(1951); Dayton v, Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949),
See generally Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal To Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
30. The Supreme Court's per curiam reversal in Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964),
seemingly marked the beginning of increased judicial review of prisoners' constitutional
claims, although a few lower courts had already begun to hear prisoner complaints.
See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1961). Inmates generally bring suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Civil rights actions filed by state prisoners increased from 218 to
2915 between 1966 and 1971. See Weinstein, Administrative Reform and the Courts, in
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SoURCEBoOK, supra note 3, at 501; Note, Prisoners' Rights Under
Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969). The Supreme Court has been careful to protect
prisoners' access to the courts under this statute, See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971) (state prisoners are not held to a stricter standard of exhaustion of remedies
than other civil rights plaintiffs); Houghton v. Schaefer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (state
prisoners are not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a suit
under section 1983). However, in Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), in which the
plaintiffs challenged the duration or fact of confinement rather than the conditions
thereof, the habeas corpus exhaustion rule was found to be applicable. One district
court has read Preiser to require an exhaustion of remedies under a newly devised
state grievance procedure before a prisoner will be allowed to bring suit under section
1983. McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), appeal doclieted, No. 74-1042
(4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1974).
The judiciary now recognizes an affirmative duty to intervene to ensure that the
prisoner receives no punishment beyond what is imposed by his sentence. One court
stated: "The courts which have been responsible for placing men behind bars under
our system of criminal justice cannot evade their continuing responsibility to protect
their basic rights after conviction, any more than the Constitution permits them to do
before conviction." In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 89-90, 296 N.E.2d 280, 285 (1973)
(emphasis original). See Spaeth, The Court's Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 V1LL.
L. R.Ev, 1031 (1971). The federal courts have the responsibility under section 1983 to
protect the constitutional rights of inmates. Since it is settled that exhaustion of state
remedies is not required in such an action, Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971),
notions of comity and federalism should not impede federal judicial review of state
correctional officials' actions. Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial
Responsibility, 53 ORE. L. REv. 29, 41-42 (1973).
31. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
32. 329 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afjd., 445 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated,
405 U.S. 319 (1972).
33. 405 U.S. at 323. The Court stated that "'a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" 405 U.S. at
322, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all "persons," including prisoners. We are not
unmindful that prison officials must be accorded latitude in the
administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are
subject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in prison,
like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government
for redress of grievances which, of course, includes "access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints."34

A second objection to the extension of the right of privacy to
prisoners is that prisons are not private places but public institutions,
and that by committing a crime that justifies incarceration the inmate
has waived his right to marital privacy.35 Prison commentator Richard
Singer has noted that "the concepts of privacy and prison are antithetical beyond comprehension: the prison is, almost by definition, a
place where the resident has lost his privacy •.. ,'' 36 and the Supreme
Court has stated in dictum that "a jail shares none of the attributes
of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room." 37
This argument, of course, is not applicable to pretrial detainees,
whose guilt has not yet been adjudicated; moreover, it begs the
question. Prisons can be freely fashioned to conform with constitutional requirements. A priori notions about the nature of prisons
are thus inappropriate in deciding whether incarceration may constitutionally include deprivation of conjugal privacy.
Finally there is the objection that a citizen's right to be free of
governmental intrusion into his marriage does not require the state
to create special places or programs in prisons for the private conduct
of marital relations. 38 In other words, a restraint on state interference
with an individual's activities does not imply an affirmative duty to
34. 405 U.S. at 321, quoting Johnson v. Ayery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
The appropriate degree of judicial intervention into the internal administration
of prisons was declared by tbe Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to involve a
three-step determination: "(l) [w]hether tbe inmate is entitled under the federal
Constitution to the particular right claimed • • • , (2) if so, whether such right has
been infringed in the case before [the court], and (3) if a constitutional right has been
infringed, what remedy is appropriate." Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 184 (1972).
This three-step determination has been employed in the conjugal visitation context.
See United States ex rel. Choice v. Johnson, Civil No. 72-2060 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1972)
(excerpted in 12 CRIM. L. REP. 2298).
35. See Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Cf. Lovisi v.
Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973) (married couple waived right of privacy
by allowing photographs of their acts of sodomy to fall into hands of daughters);
People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 447-48 (1967) (right of
privacy does not apply to homosexual relationships among prisoners).
36. Singer, supra note 9, at 669. See also E. GOFFMAN, AsYLUMs 14-35 (1961).
37. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Lanza, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, strongly intimates his disagreement with this assertion. See also In re Goalen, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974),
denying cert. to 30 Utah 2d 27, 512 P.2d 1028 (1973).
38. See Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198, 200 .(N.D. Ohio 1974).
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promote those activities. This argument also misstates the issue. The
fact that the introduction of conjugal visitation programs would require states to alter the status quo in most prisons does not change
the fundamental question: Is the right to marital privacy among those
rights that the states may constitutionally withdraw from a person
when he is incarcerated?
The principal problem in answering this question is to determine
the standard of judicial review that should be applied to prison regulations. In the nonprison context the state must carry a heavy burden
if it is to encroach on the right of privacy or on any other fundamental right. The Supreme Court stated in Roe v. Wade that,
"[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, . . . regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' ... and ... legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interest at stake."39 The Court
has also required the states to use the least restrictive means of achieving their goals where fundamental rights are involved: A "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state ;regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."40 In Wade, for example, the state's interest in the mother's
health was not found sufficiently compelling to justify regulation of
the abortion procedure during the first trimester of pregnancy. Even
after the point at which that state interest becomes compelling, the
statute prohibiting abortions except where necessary to save the life
of the mother was found to be an unjustifiably broad incursion on
the mother's right of privacy.41 Only after the point at which a fetus
becomes viable was the state interest in preserving potential human
life suffficiently compelling to justify the prohibition.42
Courts have recently employed the same close scrutiny in reviewing the conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees as when
reviewing constitutional deprivations in the nonprison context. As
one court notes, "where incarceration is imposed prior to conviction,
deterrence, punishment, and retribution are not legitimate functions
of the incarcerating officials. Their role is but a temporary holding
operation, and their necessary freedom of action is concomitantly
diminished .... Punitive measures in such a context are out of harmony with the presumption of innocence."43 In keeping with the
limited function of detention, courts have not accepted punitive justi39. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted).
40. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
41, 410 U.S. at 164.
42. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
43. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971), modified sub nom. Nosser
v. Bradley, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
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fications for infringement of detainees' constitutional rights; they
have held that deprivations are permissible only if necessary to assure the presence of the detainee at trial. Thus, only the state's
interest in security, discipline, or the maintenance of orderly institutional administration can justify the curtailment of detainees'
rights.44 Even with regard to these interests courts have steadfastly
demanded that the state show a substantial threat before infringing
on constitutional rights.45 Detainees may suffer only those constitutional deprivations that are "absolutely requisite, " 46 "absolutely
necessary,"47 "justified by a compelling necessity,"48 or " 'inherent in
... confinement itself.' " 49 Moreover, courts have generally required
that states pursue the least restrictive means of accomplishing their
interests.50
·
Under this strict standard of judicial review pretrial detainees
have a strong argument that the state must grant them conjugal visiting rights. The state's strongest justifications for denying the rights
are the security and disciplinary risks of importation of weapons or
narcotics and the circulation of escape plans.51 However, as existing
44. See Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 265 (D. Md. 1972); Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776, 785 (D.R.!. 1970).
45. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
46. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afld. sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
47. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass.
1973).
48. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
49. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971), quoting Butler v.
Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
50. See Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686
(D. Mass. 1973); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971). But see Seale v. Manson,
326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).
Some courts have reached identical conclusions under an equal protection analysis
that views detainees as a subgroup of the class of people who have been arrested and
are awaiting trial; the other subgroup in the class includes people who are out on bail
·(bailees). Detainees are treated differently from bailees because it is thought necessary
to confine the former in order to ensure their appearance at trial. Hence, as expressed
by one district court, "[e]xcept for the right to come and go as he pleases, a pre-trial
detainee retains all of the rights of a bailee, and his rights may not be ignored because
it is expedient or economical to do so. Any restrictions and deprivations of those
rights, beyond those which inhere in the confinement itself, must be justified by a
compelling necessity • • • arising from the dearth of alternatives • • • ." Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citations omitted). See also Hamilton
v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971). This analysis appears to have been
first suggested in cases involving lineups. See Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.
Pa.), permanent injunction denied on other grounds, 237 F. Supp. 58 (1964). The
application to cases challenging the conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees
was suggested in Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
51. Rhem. v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 604-07, modified, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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programs have shown,52 reasonable search procedures can generally
provide as effective a means of maintaining security as a complete
prohibition of conjugal visitation.53 Nor does it appear that the
administrative burden of instituting a conjugal visitation program
is prohibitive. 64 In any case, the courts are not inclined to defer auto•
matically to justifications based on administrative expediency, security, or discipline. In Brenneman v. Madigan,rm for instance, the court
found no adequate justification for limitations on detainees' correspondence, recreational activities, and visiting privileges. 60 The justification of administrative ease was rejected as "unpersuasive," 67 and
the court cautioned that it would not "confer carte blanche ... to
justify every restriction and deprivation by invoking the rubric of
'security' or 'discipline.' " 58 Finally, the courts have been loath to
accept limitations on state economic resources as a justification for
depriving detainees of their rights. One court bluntly stated that
"[i]nadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for
the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights." 60
Although a court cannot require the people to appropriate funds
for jail improvements or for a new facility, 60 it can order officials to
shift resources to the jails.61 At least one court has noted that it could
order the release of the detainees: "[I]f the state cannot obtain the
52. The administration of conjugal visitation programs for detainees will be very
similar to that of programs for prisoners; in many instances detainees and prisoners
are placed in the same facilities. Flynn, Jails and Criminal Justice, in PrusoNERS IN
AMERICA 49, 56 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973). Many of the concerns and problems of the state
will thus be the same. For a description of conjugal visitation programs in Mississippi
and California, see notes 152, 154 and text at notes 150-56 infra. For discussion of
possible limitations on feasibility of conjugal visitation programs depending on the
length of time the individual is incarcerated or the type of facility where the individual
is being held, see note 67 and te.xt at notes 152-55 infra.
53. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625-26, modified, 377 F. Supp, 995
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); notes 152, 154 and text at notes 150-56 infra. In the case of a notorl•
ously desperate pretrial detainee, complete prohibition may be justified by the danger
that the detainee will use the visiting spouse as a hostage in order to escape.
54. Prison administrators operating the conjugal visitation programs in Mississippi
and California have indicated that they have not experienced any serious administrative
problems. See C. HOPPER, supra note 1, at 96-97; Wilson, supra note 6, at 262; text at
note 158 infra.
55. 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
56. 343 F. Supp. at 140-42.
57. 343 F. Supp. at 139.
58. 343 F. Supp. at 140. "Only a compelling state interest centering about prison
security, or a clear and present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some substantial interference with orderly institutional administration can justify curtailment
of a prisoner's constitutional rights." Fortune Soc. v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
59. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971),
60. Courts do not have taxing power. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. '707,
712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd. sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972),
61. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. '/07, 713-14 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd. sub nom,
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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resources to detain persons awaiting trial in accordance with minimum constitutional standards, then the state simply will not be permitted to detain such persons." 62 Another court has forbidden the
housing of detainees in a particular jail, although the prohibition
was not to take effect until three years after the date of decision. 63
Several courts have specifically ordered the construction of new visitation facilities for nonconjugal visitation, as well as the institution
of relaxed visiting procedures. 64 One district court has in fact ordered
that conjugal visiting rights be granted to detainees who had been
held in maximum security for nine months. 65 Although the court did
not clearly articulate the grounds for its decision, it appeared to regard conjugal rights as fundamental. 66 However, it observed that it
might reach a different result in cases involving "the normal short
pre-trial detention period.'' 67
The strict standard of judicial scrutiny may not be appropriate
when the rights of convicted persons are at stake.68 The purpose of
incarceration is of course inconsistent with the notion of prisons as
free societies. Those in control of a prison must have authority and
discretion to abridge some prisoner rights in order to maintain security and order. As one district court has stated, "[t]he number of
state interests which may justify narrowly-tailored encroachments
upon protected freedoms is.greater in a prison setting than in almost
62. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971). See also Rhem v.
Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
63. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 691 (D. Mass.
1973).
64. E.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625-26, modified, 377 F. Supp. 995
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
690-91 (D. Mass. 1973); Jones v. Wittenberg, 357 F. Supp. 696, 700-01 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
65. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, · 3 PRISON L. REP. 20 (D.Vl.
May 30, 1973).
.
.
66. The court noted that judicial intervention on behalf of detainees is justified
only if a "constitutional deprivation" is found. 3 PrusoN L. REP. at 20. The issue
therefore was: "What rights amount to constitutional dimensions? ••• I would •••
say that certain activities would be amenities or privileges to some, but rights to
others depending upon their different lifestyles. But there are nonetheless certain·
basic conditions and activities which I believe do approach constitutional dimensions
to all ••••" 3 PRISON L. REP. at 20. The court concluded that conjugal rights are·
"basic" and that the defendants, who had been detained in maximum security for
nine months, could not be further deprived, although "conjugal rights shall be subject
to reasonable restrictions and regulations ••••" 3 PRISON L. REP. at 20.
67. 3 PRISON L. REP. at 20. There should be a distinction between
involving
long and short detention. During a short period of detention a detainee's privacy
right is not substantially infringed by a denial of conjugal visitation. Yet it is difficult
to determine how long a detainee can be held before his marital privacy is substantially
infringed. Even if a "normal" pretrial detention period can in fact be established, it
should perhaps not be accorded much weight because it is indicative less of the degree
of infringement of the detainee's right than of the degree to which the court's docket
is clogged.
68. For a detailed elucidation of the argument for strict scrutiny, see Millemann,.
supra note 30.

cases

408

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '18:898

any other area of state regulation. The true constitutional balance
leaves the state free to deal effectively with any contingency."00 The
Supreme Court has employed strict scrutiny almost exclusively to
invalidate legislation when fundamental interests or the rights of
suspect classes have been infringed.70 Applied to prisoner's rights a
strict standard of review might result in the invalidation of many
necessary prison restraints. 71 The prison context thus seems to require a standard of review less rigorous than strict scrutiny.
The fact that prisons must exert considerable control over inmates' lives,72 however, suggests several reasons why courts should
apply a standard of review more protective of prisoners' rights than
minimal scrutiny, which requires merely a rational relationship between a legitimate state purpose and the legislative means chosen. 78
First, prison inmates are a discrete and insular minority, and lack the
political power to effectuate legislative reform of the conditions of
their confinement. Although strict scrutiny has generally been applied to protect groups whose defining characteristics are immutable,74
69. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 111 (S.D. Iowa 1973), affd,, 491 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1974).
70. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972): Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
"Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state
interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it
demands nothing less than perfection." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). But cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See generally Note, The Decline and
Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. R.Ev. 1489, 1494-96
(1972).
71. See text at note 91 infra.
72. "[P]risoners more than any others are subjected to state control. State officials
govern inmates' lives by a series of decisions on an hourly, indeed continual, basis."
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971). On the general characteristics
of total institutions, see E. GoFFMAN, supra note 36, at 3-124 (1968).
73. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), for the application of the minimal
scrutiny test in a case concerning an amendment to the Social Security Act that pro•
vided for the termination of benefits to aliens deported on certain grounds. The Court
held that the amendment did not violate the due process clause: "Particularly when
we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program
such as this, we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose
a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking
in rational justification." 363 U.S. at 611.
The courts usually uphold challenged legislation under minimal scrutiny. E.g.,
Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). Minimal scrutiny has led to similar results
under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S.
l (1974): San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Some recent cases, however, have invalidated legislation under the minimal scrutiny standard. See, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972): Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of these cases, see Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal
- Protection, 72 MtCH. L. R.Ev. 508, 526-33 (1974).
74. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (sex) (plurality opinion):
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the Supreme Court has long recognized that political impotence is
an important factor calling for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation or regulations directed at minorities.75 As one federal court
of appeals noted: "Most decisionmaking of correctional personnel is
less visible to the public than is the d~cisionmaking of other public
officials, and therefore less likely to benefit from the inherent constraints of public discussion and scrutiny.... [T]here exist awesome
possibilities for misuse of discretion to the extent that decisions
which affect prisoners in important ways be made arbitrarily or based
upon mistakes of fact." 76 Because of their lack of political influence
with the executive and legislative branches of government, prisoners
must depend on the courts to vindicate their rights. Second, many
institutional restrictions result from administrative judgments made
wit4out the aid of legislative guidelines. Courts have traditionally
shown less deference to such judgments.77 Furthermore, courts often
defer to administrative judgments because of the administrators'
expertise in the subject of the dispute. 78 Prison commentator Michael
Millemann has pointed out, however, that the crucial day-to-day
decisions in prisons are made by undertrained, lower-echelon officials;
moreover, decisions that are in fact made by skilled, higher-level
officials are often unduly colored by their perception of budgetary
limitations.7° Finally, a minimal scrutiny standard that always results
in upholding prison regulations is inappropriate for the reasons advanced earlier to justify judicial review of prisoner complaints.80
Morales v. Schmidt81 illustrates the attempt by the federal courts
to define the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of prisoner chalWeber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (illegitimacy); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (race). See Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065, 1126-27 (1969).
75. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has applied this principle to prisoners. See Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280,
1284 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 3710 (U.S. July 8, 1974), modified on remand,
16 CRIM. L. REP. 2295 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 1974).
76. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W.
3710 (U.S. July 8, 1974), modified on remand, 16 CRIM. L. REP. 2295 (1st Cir. Dec. 20,
1974).
77. See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1348 (1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
remanded on rehearing en bane, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974). When first amendment
values are at stake, the Supreme Court has demanded specific legislative guidelines
before it will sustain the application of statutes prohibiting expression in public places,
Compare Cox v. Louisiana [No. 24], 379 U.S. 536 (1965), with Cox v. Louisiana [No. 49],
379 U.S. 559 (1965).
78. 4 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.09, at 240-46 (1958).
79. Millemann, supra note 30, at 40.
80. See note 30 and text at notes 30-34 supra.
81. 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), reud., 489 F.2d 1335 (1973), remanded on rehearing en bane, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
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· 1enges. In that case a prisoner sought to resume correspondence with
a sister-in-law whose name had been stricken from his approved
correspondence list because of the previous illicit sexual relationship
between them. The district court found nothing in the Constitution
or decisions of the Supreme Court justifying the application of different standards for constitutional challenges brought by prisoners
and nonprisoners. 82 Regarding freedom to use the mails as a fundamental first amendment right, the court adopted an equal protection
analysis83 and imposed on the state the burden of showing a compelling interest in placing greater restrictions on prisoners' freedom
of correspondence than on the freedom of nonprisoners. The state's
interest in security and rehabilitation were judged insufficient
under that test, and the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a
temporary injunction.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 84 finding
a suggestion in the thirteenth amendment85 that involuntary servitude may be imposed upon one convicted of a crime.80 Although the
incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights, including the eighth
amendment, into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend82. 340 F. Supp. at 550.
The court noted the lack of guidance in previous cases on this issue:
To say that the federal courts should generally defer to the judgment of ad•
ministrators of state correctional facilities, or to say, on the other hand, that in•
mates of state prisons enjoy some degree of protection from th.e Fourteenth
Amendment, is to express an attitude but little more. I discover in the cases
scarcely a single beam or joist in a framework of principles within which a par•
ticular constitutional challenge to a particular prison regulation can be decided.
340 F. Supp. at 548.
83. Under an equal protection analysis it could be argued that denial of conjugal
privacy of prisoners deprives them and their spouses of equal protection, because mar•
ried nonprisoners are not similarly restricted in the exercise of that right. Such an
argument is identical to the argument that the prohibition of conjugal visiting de•
prives the married couple of their right to privacy. In both cases the ultimate question
to be decided by the court is whether prisons may constitutionally prohibit sexual
relations between husband and wife. Where fundamental rights are infringed, re•
viewing courts under current equal protection analysis require the state to show that
the deprivation is necessary to further a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Since the right to marital privacy is fundamental,
the issue of the appropriate standard of judicial review also arises when the prisoner's
claim is couched in terms of equal protection. Thus, this note will not address the
issue of the constitutionality of the denial of conjugal visitation under the equal protection clause, See also Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1973), affd.,
488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974) (equal protection claims for conjugal visits by prisoner
and his wife rejected by the district court for lack of evidence that the wife had been
discriminated against, since many prisoners' wives are not permitted conjugal visits
and nothing requires uniform policies throughout the federal prison system).
84. 489 F.2d 1335 (1973), remanded on rehearing en bane, 494 F.2d 85 (1974).
85. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
86. Cf. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va, (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871). "He [the convicted
person] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is
for the time being the slave of the State." 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796.
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ment had "moderated the harsh implications of the Thirteenth
Amendment," the court recognized that "tension remains between
the view that a prisoner enjoys many constitutional rights, which
rights can be limited only to the extent necessary for the maintenance
of a person's status as a prisoner (or parolee), and the view that a
prisoner has only a few rudimentary rights and must accept whatever
regulations and restrictions prison administrators and State law deem
essential to a correctional system."87 The court also relied on Supreme
Court dicta stating that the "[r]evocation [of parole] deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,
but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance
of special parole restrictions,'' 88 and that "[t]he State has found the
parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That finding justifies
imposing extensive restrictions on the individual's liberty." 89 The
appeals court found that this language applied equally to prisoners
and therefore authorized substantially greater restrictions on prisoners than on nonprisoners. 00 In addition, the court shared the defendants' concern that with the adoption of the compelling state interest
standard "few prison regulations will be able to withstand constitutional attack. Prisoners ... will contest every disciplinary measure,
and prison administrators will be unable to command the adherence
to rules which allows the correctional system to function smoothly."91
The appellate court in Morales determined that the appropriate
standard for judicial review was whether the regulation bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. However, it carefully eschewed reliance upon the "hands-off" doctrine, stating that
"to allow prison administrators to determine the constitutional rights
of a convicted person would be to abdicate our responsibilities." 92
Furthermore, the standard was not merely an " 'obeisance to a warden's asserted expertise' "; 93 thus the district court was urged to examine closely the proffered state justifications on remand.a!
Morales was reheard by the appellate court en banc.95 The en bane
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

489 F.2d at Ul38.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
489 F.2d at 1342.
489 F.2d at 1341.
489 F.2d at 1342.
489 F.2d at 1343, quoting Spaeth, supra note 30, at 1037.
The court of appeals panel remanded to the district court for a decision in
light of the new standard. 489 F.2d at 1343-44. Judge Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
Although be too disagreed with the district judge's analysis, be believed that the
lower court was correct in granting the injunction. In bis view the state's prohibition
of the plaintiff's correspondence was a "prior restraint'' on the plaintiff's speech and
invalid under a contemporaneous Wisconsin decision requiring the action to be supported by a reasonable regulation furthering a legitimate state purpose. 489 F.2d at
1346-47.
95. 494 F,2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
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court held to its previous disposition, but Judge Pell's opinion acknowledged that "difficulty [had] been experienced in articulating
a disposition ... in a manner satisfactory to a majority of the active
judges of this court."96 The court reaffirmed its holding that the
proper standard for review was whether the "restriction is related
both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of a justifiable
purpose of imprisonment," but emphasized its view that the same
result might ultimately be reached as under the district court's
standard. 97 Judge Stevens :filed a concurring opinion in which he
reasserted his view that the result reached by the district court was
correct, although he too disagreed with the compelling state interest
standard applied by the lower court.98 Chief Judge S·wygert also concurred, noting that he would require "the State to assume a heavy
burden of justification" by demonstrating that "the restriction is not
only reasonable but that there is a substantial necessity for it. This
more forceful standard would be less than a compelling State interest
but clearly more than a rational relationship between the restriction
and prison discipline and rehabilitation." 00
The Morales district court was faced with the task of interpreting
the court of appeals decisions in the subsequent case of Mabra v.
Schmidt. 100 In Mabra the plaintiff claimed that his confinement in
a prison's segregation building deprived him of the right to visit
with his infant children. The district judge :first restated his Morales
view that where a prison regulation deprives a prisoner of a fundamental right, equal protection requires that the discrimination vis-avis nonprisoners be justified by a compelling state interest.101 Nevertheless, the court recognized that it was bound by the appellate court
decision in Morales. However, it interpreted that decision as retaining
the familiar two-tier equal protection analysis but dividing the category of fundamental interests into two subcategories.102 The state
would be required to show a compelling interest in order to justify
the deprivation of a fundamental right falling into one subcategory,
but deprivations of fundamental rights in the second subcategorylike the right involved in Morales-would require only a rational
basis.
On the merits of the Mabra case, the court determined that the
freedom to associate with one's children was a fundamental aspect of
privacy under Roe v. Wade. It decided that this right fell within the
96. 494 F .2d at 86.
97. 494 F.2d at 87.
98. 494 F.2d at 87.
99. 494 F.2d at 88.
100. 356 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
IOI. 356 F. Supp. at 625.
102. The appellate court opinions in Morales do not explicitly support this inter•
pretation.
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Morales subcategory,103 and thus assigned the state the burden of
showing that the segregation restriction was rationally related to the
advancement of a legitimate purpose. The court held that the state
failed to carry that burden and denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
The differences described above illustrate the difficulty of deciding
upon an appropriate standard of review of prison regulations. However, the different standards enunciated by the district and appellate
courts in Morales and Mabra seem to be moving toward a common
position. The minimal scrutiny advocated by the appellate court is
not meant to imply complete judicial abdication, and at least Chief
Judge Swygert would require a standard higher than minimal
scrutiny. In Mabra, the district court envisioned applying the compelling state interest_ test with enough flexibility to ensure the unfettered evolution of correctional practices and constitutional doctrine, emphasizing "that the adjudicative processes, techniques, and
approaches should be administered evenhandedly by the courts, not
that the results should be uniform."104 Correctional officials could
take comfort in its prediction that rational relationships, reasonable
necessities, and compelling state interests would probably be frequently discovered by courts, and its comment that "[h]istorically,
the courts have surely been disposed to preserve the correctional
system."105 Nevertheless, the more restrictive language of the district
court's modification of the strict standard would probably result in
invalidating more prison regulations than would the modification of
minimal scrutiny advocated by the appellate court.
It is submitted that none of the standards of review enunciated
in Morales and Mabra adequately take into account the competing
interests of the prisoner and the state. Nor are the factors that a court
should weigh in striking an accommodation between the competing
interests explicitly identified. For example, the Morales appellate
court's rational relationship standard requires close examination of
state justifications for the abridgement of a prisoner's fundamental
rights, without indicating how that examination should differ from
traditional minimal scrutiny or how a court can tell when an asserted
state interest is legitimate. The failure of these standards to provide
proper guidance will create substantial uncertainty in future cases,
which in tum may "unnecessarily ... perpetuate the involvement
of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration,"106 an involve103. But cf. McGregor v. Schmidt, 358 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (restriction
imposed on parolee that he remain within the state infringed his fundamental right
of interstate travel and had to be justified by a compelling state interest).
104. 356 F. Supp. at 630.
105. 356 F. Supp. at 630.
106. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974).
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ment especially unfortunate where state prisons are concerned.107
Furthermore, the lack of guidance permits a judge's unarticulated
and possibly subjective values to control the outcome of a case,
A balancing test may provide a more suitable method of achieving
the middle ground of judicial review sought by the courts in Morales.
The Eighth Circuit has in fact accepted a balancing test, holding that
"when the claim is that a prison regulation infringes upon a constitutional right, 'a court must balance the asserted need for the regulation in furthering prison security or orderly administration against
the claimed constitutional right and the degree to which it has been
impaired.' " 108 The Supreme Court also adopted the balancing approach in Pell v. Procunier. 100 In that case inmates challenged under
the first and fourteenth amendments a California prison regulation
prohibiting press interviews with specific inmates. Assuming without
deciding that first amendment rights were at stake, the Court
characterized Pell as a case "where 'we [are] called upon to balance
First Amendment rights against [legitimate] governmental . . .
interests.' " 110 An important factor in the balancing process was the
Court's recognition that the prisoner's right to communicate by mail
or through visits provided alternative means of communication with
the outside world. Moreover, permitting the press interviews would
have created security and administrative problems. The combination
of these factors led the Court to hold the regulation valid.
Such a balancing technique is not necessarily inconsistent with
the established constitutional doctrine that deprivations of fundamental rights must be justified by compelling state interests. The
state, through criminal convictions comporting with due process of
law, has presumably shown compelling reasons for incarcerating
prisoners. The state thus has already shown a compelling interest in
depriving convicted persons of those rights that are inconsistent with
incarceration. The sole issue presented when a prisoner challenges a
particular deprivation, therefore, is whether the exercise of the right
is inconsistent with incarceration. In Pell the Supreme Court seemed
to base its use of balancing with regard to first amendment rights on
a similar analysis, stating:
[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent ·with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges
to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment
107. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
108. Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (1972), quoting Smith v. Robbins, 328 F.
Supp. 162, 164 (D. Me. 1971), afjd., 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972). See also" Gittlemacker
v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
109. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
110. 417 U.S. at 824, quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. '153, 765 (1972).

December 1974]

Notes

415

interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and
goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner
has been committed in accordance with due process of law.111

The Court apparently viewed balancing as the appropriate means of
reconciling the asserted first amendment rights with the legitimate
policies and goals of the correctional system. Balancing seems equally
appropriate where other fundamental interests are at stake.112
The utility of the Pell balancing test, however, requires a fuller
enumeration of the many state interests in incarceration. Four goals
of imprisonment are generally recognized: retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and confinement of the prisoner for the protection
of society.113 Other state interests relate primarily to the practical
problems associated with running a prison, especially the maintenance
of security and order. Administrative convenience may also be entitled to some weight, although budgetary limitations must be discounted.114 A court will have to inquire whether the challenged
regulation actually furthers these interests, and less weight should be
assigned to regulatory purposes that the state could achieve by alternatives less destructive of constitutional rights.115 Courts must recognize the need of prison administrators for some degree of discretion
in dealing with day-to-day problems,116 and when the administrators'
professional expertise plays a role in the exercise of their discretion,
their judgment should be entitled to special weight.117
111. 417 U.S. at 822.
112. However, the balancing test is inappropriate where nonfundamental rights are
at stake. Balancing is designed to resolve the conflict between the nature of the prison
as an institution and the strict scrutiny test generally applied in cases involving fundamental rights. Since this conflict does not exist when a fundamental right is not at
stake, the balancing test is inapplicable.
113. Cressy, Adult Felons in Prison, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA, supra note 52, at 117,
125-26.
114. See text at note 59 supra.
115. This notion is similar to the doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative."
''When the government has 'reasonable and adequate alternatives available' to a
given end, it must choose the measure which least interferes with individual liberties."
Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1288 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 3710
(U.S. July 8, 1974), modified on remand, 16 CRIM. L. REP. 2295 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 1974),
quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). See also Chambers,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1145-51 (1972); Wormuth & Mirkin, The
Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 passim (1964).
116. For example, an administrator should have discretionary authority to order a
prison lockup when warranted by emergency circumstances. See Biagiarelli v. Sielaff,
483 F,2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973), ajfd., 495
F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974).
117. For example, balancing the rehabilitative effect of personal contact during
ordinary visitation against the inherent security risks is
·
peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials
and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that th~
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should
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On the other side of the balance, the court must consider the
nature of the right infringed and the degree of the infringement.
While all fundamental rights are entitled to a great deal of weight,
in the prison context some fundamental rights are more important
than others. For example, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he
constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the
requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to
challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of
their constitutional rights."118 Therefore, the Court has consistently
invalidated undue restrictions imposed upon the right of access to the
courts. 119 A court should ascribe greater weight to that right than
to the right to travel, which is clearly inconsistent with the requirements of incarceration. Similarly, the greater the infringement of the
fundamental right, the greater weight the court should give the prisoner's claim. If the infringement is minor, or if the prisoner has
legitimate alternative means of exercising his rights, his claim should
be assigned less weight. Illustratively, in Johnson v. Avery120 the Supreme Court held a Tennessee regulation prohibiting the activities
of a jailhouse lawyer to be an impermissible intrusion upon the
prisoner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
While holding that prison "writ-writing" could not be prohibited
in the absence of alternative means of legal assistance, the Court
noted that reasonable time and place limitations were legitimate.121
By enumerating the interests that are to be considered on behalf
of the state and the prisoner, the proposed balancing test will give
more guidance to_ courts than do the standards proposed in Morales
or Pell. Balancing_ always presents the possibility that the outcome
of a case will depend upon a court's subjective evaluation of the interests involved, but this danger may be limited somewhat by requiring judges to consider only certain interests and to make their value
judgments explicit. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that balancing
will do nothing to reduce the federal-state clash produced when federal courts intervene in the administration of state prisons. Still,
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. Courts cannot, of
course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties. But when the issue involves a regulation limiting one of several
means of communication by an inmate, the institutional objectives furthered by
that regulation and the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials
in their attempt to serve those interests are relevant in gauging the validity of
the regulation.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
118. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
119. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S.
15 (1971), afjg. per curiam Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D, Cal. 1970);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
120. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
121. 393 U.S. at 490.
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balancing provides a more sensible and just reconciliation of state
and individual interests than either strict or minimal scrutiny.
Applying the proposed standard of judicial review to conjugal
visiting rights, the issue is whether a program for securing to the
prisoner the meaningful exercise of the fundamental right of marital
privacy is on balance inconsistent with state interests in incarceration.
It can be argued that the exercise of this particular fundamental
right is especially important because of the negative impact that the
denial of conjugal visits has on the prisoner. One obvious effect is
physiological frustration, 122 which is apparently heightened by the
inmate's accessibility to sex-oriented publications and programs and
pomography.123 Furthermore, according to one writer, the sexual
experience of inmates prior to imprisonment tends to be broader
than that of nonprisoners: "The men who make up the bulk of the
imprisoned populations tend to be drawn from deprived sections of
the society . . . . As a consequence, the sexual experience of these
men and the meaning that sex has for them differs in significant ways
from other portions of the population that are less likely to be imprisoned.''124
-· ·,·
The psychological impact upon the inmate is even more profound.
Virtually all contacts with the opposite sex are cut off. The denial of
conjugal visiting rights deprives the inmate of an important source
of emotional support.125 Perhaps the most significant psychological
effect of the deprivation of heterosexual relations, however, is the
impact upon the prisoner's self-image.126 The sexual frustration felt
by a male inmate deprived of heterosexual relationships can cause
him anxiety concerning his status as a male.127 Where the inmate's
adjustment to the sexual deprivation of prison evokes latent homosexual tendencies and behavior the result is likely to be an acute psychological onslaught upon the inmate's "ego image.'?28 Even where
homosexual tendencies do not develop into behavior, they will
"arouse strong guilt feelings at either the conscious or unconscious
level." 129 Moreover, especially in the case of adolescent inmates, life122. G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPnvEs 71 (1958).
123. D. Cr.EMMER, THE PRISON CO:MMUNITY 255 (1940).
124. P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 9. See id. at 8-11.
125. C. HOPPER, supra note 1, at 147; H. Kl.ARE, supra note 3, at 64-65.
126, G. SYKES, supra note 122, at 72.
127. Id. at 71. Because of the paucity of available information concerning women's
prisons, this note focuses on the problems created within men's institutions. However,
it is likely that substantially similar considerations obtain in women's prisons. See D.
WARD &: G. KASSEBAUM, Wo:MEN'S PRISONS (1965). For a constitutional critique of the
separation of prisoners by sex, see Note, The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons,
82 YALE L.J. 1229 (1973).
128. G. SYKES, supra note 122, at 72. For descriptions of the hierarchy of homo- ·
sexual prison roles, see P. BUFFUM, supra note 3, at 14-18; G. SYKES, supra, at 95-99.
129. G. SYKES, supra note 122, at 71.
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time patterns of sexual behavior may be shaped by homosexual experiences in prisons.13° Finally, conflicts arising from homosexual
relationships may lead to physical violence.131
The fact that the prisoner's right of marital privacy is shared by
a nonprisoner spouse provides another reason for according this right
great weight. In Procunier v. Martinez 132 the Supreme Court relied
upon the nonprisoner rights infringed by censorship of prisoner mail
to invalidate prison censorship regulations. Because nonprisoner
rights were at stake, the Court employed a strict standard of review,133
holding that the prison officials' discretion to censor "statements that
'unduly complain' or 'magnify grievances,' expressions of 'inflammatory political, racial, or religious, or other views,' and matter
deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherw'ise inappropriate' " 134 was "far
broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration." 18 G
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the first amendment rights of prisoners alone would invalidate the censorship.
Finally, the prisoner's right of marital privacy is entitled to great
weight because the deprivation is total: Prisoners have no sexual
privacy in their marital relations when conjugal visitation is prohibited. The situation is thus fundamentally different from that in
Pell, where the Court relied upon the availability to inmates of alternative means of communication to uphold a prison regulation prohibiting press interviews. A prisoner's only alternative for achieving marital privacy is the home furlough, which is infrequently
available.136
130. H. :BARNFS &: N. TEETERS, supra note 3, at 377-78; J. FISHMAN, supra note 3,
at 83, 86-89; J. MAR.TIN, :BREAK DOWN THE WALLS 180 (1954).
131. For example, it has been estimated that nearly every slightly built young
prisoner will be sexually approached within minutes of admission. P. :BUFFUM, supra
note 3, at 18. The young inmate may be eager to cultivate a friendship with an
obliging inmate in order to ease his anxieties. As he accepts friendly overtures, how•
ever, he becomes dependent upon his benefactor to the extent that when the desire
to develop a homosexl!al relationship is revealed, the young inmate's indebtedness
affords him no choices other than submitting or being beaten or killed. D. CLElllMER,
supra note 123, at 263-74. See also id. at 270-71, quoting an anonymous ex-inmate:
"Many a knife 'scrape' in prison can be laid at the door of some fair-haired lad.
Usually the wielders of 'shivs' are fighting over an affair of amour, while not a few
onlookers are hoping that both duelists send each other to the hospital so they can
have a 'chance' at the lad. I have seen some serious knife-slashing-over what? Over
the affections of some 'punk.' " Potential violence is but one example of the destruc•
tive influence of institutional homosexuality on the inmate. See P. :BUFFUlll, supra,
at 14-15; J. FISHlllAN, supra note 3, at 83-89; G. SYKFS, supra note 122, at 95-99.
132. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
133. 416 U.S. at 413-14.
134. 416 U.S. at 415, quoting Director's Rules 1201, 1205, 2402(8).
135. 416 U.S. at 416. The Court, however, would have upheld prison mail censorship to the extent that it enabled prison officials to refuse to deliver escape plans or
encoded messages. 416 U.S. at 413.
136. At the Parchman penitentiary in Mississippi, for example, which has a relatively liberal furlough program, only prisoners who have served at least three years
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On the other side of the balance, the state can assert the basic
goals of incarceration as justification for infringing on marital
privacy. Retribution and deterrence137 are clearly served by a condition of imprisonment as unpleasant to the inmate as sexual deprivation. The protective function is also served, albeit only to the extent
that denial of conjugal visitation facilitates the maintenance of prison
security.138 As long as the prisoner remains under prison supervision
society is protected from his unlawful activity. The goal of rehabilitating the prisoner, however, is frustrated. The deprivation of heterosexual conduct has been shmvn to have psychologically destructive
effects on the ininate139 and his marriage.14° Conjugal visits would
mitigate these negative effects and thereby facilitate rehabilitation.
The extent to which a positive effect on rehabilitation should be
regarded as offsetting the state's interest in retribution and deterrence
is unclear. The Supreme Court has not required the states to rank
their interests in the goals of incarceration, although Justice Marshall
has stated that the eighth amendment prohibits a state from making
retribution the sole object of punishment.141 In dictum the Court
has noted that retribution is no longer the dominant objective of
imprisonment and that rehabilitation has become increasingly important.142 Nevertheless, tW'O federal circuit courts have upheld the
states' rights to pursue retributive goals.143 One federal district court
with good behavior records are granted furloughs. C. HOPPER, supra note I, at 50-51.
Even in Sweden, which also has a liberal furlough policy, leaves are granted only
after a third of the prisoner's sentence has been completed, with a maximum frequency of one leave every three months. Id. at 7-8. For a detailed account of the
Pennsylvania home furlough program, see Comment, An Evaluation of the Home
Furlough Program in Pennsylvania Correctional Institutions, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 288 (1974).
137. G. SYKES, supra note 122, at 10-11. See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23
(1974); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 550 (1st Cir. 1971); Morales v. Schmidt,
revd., 489 F.2d 1335 (1973), remanded on rehearing en bane, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir.
1974).
138. Security as a state interest is discussed in text at notes 146-56 infra.
139. See text at notes 122-31 supra.
140. For an intensive analysis of the impact of prison separation upon family relationships, see P. MORRIS, PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES (1965).
One study of post-release failures concludes that "[m]en whose first residence is with
their wives have the fewest failures, and those living alone have the most." D. GLASER,
THE EFFEctlVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 249 (abr. ed. 1969).
The officials at the Correctional Institute at Tehachapi in California advanced as
partial justification for their program of conjugal visiting that "[i]t is our contention
that we do not protect society by contributing to the dissolution of the family
unity • • • • A broken family in all probability becomes a permanent welfare case.
Without his wife and children, the prison parolee starts his re-entry into the social
experience with another great handicap-his failure as a husband and father." Wilson,
supra note 6, at 262.
141. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342-45 (1972) (concurring opinion).
142. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 248 (1949).
143. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
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has refused to require a state to adopt rehabilitation as a goal,144 but
another has required that rehabilitation prevail over other state goals
when there is conflict among them. 145 Even in the absence of a priority ranking, it is arguable that rehabilitation is entitled to substantial weight and that the inconsistency with rehabilitative goals should
reduce the weight assigned to retribution and deterrence as justifications for denying conjugal visiting rights.
A denial of conjugal visitation also furthers the state interest in
prison security. Private visiting may increase the risk of secret importation of drugs and weapons or the seizure of hostages, and may
facilitate escape. Although the courts have steadfastly recognized the
need to maintain security within the prison, they have also made it
clear that an alleged interest in security will not justify every deprivation. In Johnson v. Avery,146 for example, prison authorities argued
that prohibiting an inmate from acting as attorney for other inmates
was "justified as a part of the State's disciplinary administration of
the prisons.''147 The Supreme Court admitted that "prison 'writ
writers' . . . are sometimes a menace to prison discipline" 148 but
concluded that the state could not foreclose inmates from enlisting
the legal assistance of other inmates without providing a reasonable
alternative method of legal assistance. In Pell v. Procunier, ·however,
the Court relied in part upon security grounds to uphold the challenged regulation prohibiting press interviews. The Court stated that
"[a]lthough they would not permit prison officials to prohibit all
expression or communication by prison inmates, security considerations are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison
to justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of outsiders
into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates.''149
The weight of the state's interest in maintaining prison security
should be reduced by the presence of an effective alternative to the
complete denial of conjugal visits-personal searches of the visiting
spouses and of the inmates. In the Mississippi conjugal visitation
program, for example, visiting spouses are searched,150 and the pro(1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972).
144. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971). See Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968) (plurality opinion): "This Court has never held that
anything in the Constitution requires that penal sanctions be designed solely to
achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects ••• .'' See also Johnson v. Rockefeller,
365 F. Supp. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
145. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1094-96 (M.D. Fla.), revd. on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974).
146. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
147. 393 U.S. at 486.
148. 393 U.S. at 488.
149. 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
150. C. HOPPER, supra note l, at 49-50,
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gram has apparently not led to additional security problems.151 It is
important to note that the Mississippi penitentiary that has instituted
conjugal visitation is a farm prison; prisoners are located in small,
separate camps and are thus more easily controlled th~ in a prison
with a concentrated inmate population.152 In California, however,
"family visiting in which wives, parents, children and other family
members of inmates are permitted two-day visits in the privacy of
home-like apartments"153 has been initiated in all state correctional
institutions, including Folsom Prison, California's maximum-security
facility. 154 Moreover, the California Department of Corrections "is
attempting to increase its family visiting facilities, particularly within
security sectors."155 While family visiting programs in this country
are too new to dispel completely the fear of security and discipline
151. Id. at 89-98.
152. Id. at 75-79.
Mississippi operates its conjugal visitation program at the Parchman penitentiary,
where the program has developed informally since 1918. Until 1963 there were no
funds allocated for the construction of facilities. Id. at 52. Initially private visits
occurred in the prisoner's quarters; later, inmates were allowed to construct more
private "red houses." Id. at 53-55. Following an initial search of the visitor, id. at
49-50, and a showing of identification and verification of marriage to the prisoner
visited, id. at 56, the inmate and his wife are relatively free to walk around the
grounds and are unsupervised until the end of the visit. Id. at 56-57. The use of the
"red house" is similarly unstructured, and the facilities are shared among the inmates in a cooperative fashion. Id. at 59-60. By informal agreement those inmates
not participating stay away from the area in which the "red houses" are located. Id.
Visits are permitted on alternate Sundays. Id. at 49.
Every married male inmate at Parchman not in the maximum security unit is free
to participate. There is no good behavior requirement, and a survey taken in 1968
revealed that almost sixty per cent of the married inmates participated. Id. at 61-62.
Generally, those not participating had wives who lived too far away, had not been
getting along well with their wives, or had simply chosen not to participate. Id.
at 61. In a survey taken at Parchman, 90 per cent of the single prisoners questioned
expressed no resentment toward the privilege afforded the married inmates, and few
(less than 10 per cent) of the participating prisoners reported embarrassment or
difficulties arising from the other inmates. Id. at 98-101.
153. State of California Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Corrections,
California Department of Corrections 3 (1973) (pamphlet describing the California
correctional institutions).
154. California Department of Corrections, Status Report 17 (1974). The program
was originally instituted at the Correctional Institute at Tehachapi, where it was
formulated expressly to deal with the problem of the strain on the family unit caused
by the long absence of the imprisoned parent. The Tehachapi program allows the
inmate to stay for two days with his immediate family at special cottages on the prison
grounds. The cottages provide a relaxed, family-like setting with adequate facilities,
although the range of available activities is limited. Prison officials view the opportunity for husband and wife to engage in sexual relations, with the accompanying
benefits of curtailing homosexuality among inmates and extra-marital activity by
wives, as an incidental feature of the program. In addition to proving a legitimate
family relationship with prospective visitors, a participating inmate must be within
his minimum eligible parole date and have established at least a six-month good
conduct record. The reaction of participating families and of state officials has been
positive. Wilson, supra note 6, at 261-64.
155. California Department of Corrections, supra note 154, at 17.
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problems, no evidence exists that such problems will in fact arise.
The state should perhaps not be allowed to rely on this argument for
infringing upon a fundamental right unless it proves a direct, factual
connection between denying conjugal visitation and the maintenance
of security.156 Complete denial of conjugal visits seems unsupportable,
at least where minimum security or farm prisons are involved.
The implementation of a conjugal visitation program also involves some administrative burdens. For example, it will be necessary
to determine the validity of alleged marriages,157 and conducting
personal searches will require prison manpower. Implementation
will also require the construction of new facilities or the conversion
of existing buildings. Scheduling of visits will entail additional
record-keeping. Administrative burdens should not be over-estimated,
however. California has instituted a program that accommodates
6,000 family visits per year, yet "[n]o budget increases were involved.
In some instances inmates constructed visiting facilities using salvaged
lumber and materials."158
Even if substantial administrative costs are entailed, the weight to
which they should be entitled is not clear. In Wolff v. McDonnell1 60
the Supreme Court sanctioned a limited deprivation of due process
rights in the name of convenience of prison administration. The
Court held that the imposition of certain prison disciplinary sanctions
must be preceded by minimal notions of procedural due process,
including ·written notice, a written factfinding report, and an opportunity for the prisoner to call witnesses and to present documentary
evidence in his defense. It rejected the state's argument that the less
burdensome procedures it provided were sufficient, but also rejected
the inmate's contention that he should be provided with counsel at
the disciplinary hearings.160 The Court was especially concerned that
providing counsel would unduly prolong the proceedings.161
Wolff may be limited by the fact that it dealt with the requirements of procedural due process. The Court recognized that the procedures constitutionally required in a given situation depend upon
the institutional setting.162 Thus, it is peculiarly appropriate to con156. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 6'17, 689-90 (1978).
157. C. HOPPER, supra note 1, at 96. See notes 152, 154 supra.
158. California Department of Corrections, supra note 154, at 17.
159. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
160. 418 U.S. at 560.
161. 418 U.S. at 570.
162. We have often repeated that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." ••• "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that
has been affected by governmental action." ••• Viewed in this light it is immedi-
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sider administrative burdens in determining procedural due process
requirements. On the other hand, conjugal visitation concerns the
fundamental substantive right of marital privacy. It is less appropriate that institutional concerns should shape the content of this
right. Moreover, it is well established that economic costs cannot
justify the infringement of a fundamental right,1 63 and a conjugal
visitation program would be burdensome, if at all, chiefly in terms
of manpower and money. By contrast, the Court in Wolff found that
the administrative burdens imposed by allowing inmates to be represented by counsel at disciplinary hearings would have changed the
fundamental nature of the hearings and "reduce[d] their utility as
a means to further correctional goals." 164
·
Although there are weighty interests on both sides of the issue,
a strong argument can be made that a court must find that married
prisoners and their spouses have a constitutional right to participate
in a program of conjugal visitation. Whether the balance will be
struck in the prisoner's favor will depend primarily on the relative
importance of the conflicting purposes of imprisonment. If rehabilitation remains the favored goal, as it now seems to be, the benefits
of conjugal visiting should tip the scales in the prisoner's favor. In
any case, the implementation of a conjugal visitation program makes
sense because the rehabilitative benefits of such a program can be
gained at little expense to the goals of retribution and deterrence.
Prisons will remain unpleasant places even if conjugal visiting is
allowed several times a month. Imprisonment will confer no less of
a social stigma because of the presence of such a program.
This note has considered only whether prisoners in general are
entitled to any conjugal visitation. If the conclusion that prisoners
are constitutionally entitled to that right is accepted, many administrative details must be resolved: How often must conjugal visitation
be made available; in which types of prisons must conjugal visits be
instituted; for what reasons, if any, may the right be withdrawn from
an individual prisoner? Administrative discretion and expertise will
be entitled to much weight in making these practical decisions. All
the courts can do is ensure that the right is generally available and
that substantial reasons justify cases of individual deprivation.
ately apparent that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for
free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited
restraints, to the very different situations presented by a disciplinary proceeding
in a state prison.
418 U.S. at 560, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (citations omitted).
163. See text at note 59 supra.
164. 418 U.S. at 570.

